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Taking the Home
 
Jeannie Suk*
 
Abstract. 
 
Law resists the uncanny. The home is the exemplar of the uncanny. Two Supreme Court
cases, decided four days apart, Kelo v. City of New London and Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales,
grapple with the uncanny home. Both reﬂect on the meanings of the home as simultaneously the
source of security against and the focal point of anxieties about crossing between the categories of the
private and the public. This essay traces the specter of doubleness that haunts the home in the law:
the uncanny ways in which the home emerges as the exemplary private institution and the exem-
plary public concern in our society. 
 
Keywords:
 
 home, property, family, takings, eminent domain, domestic violence, restraining
orders, due process, mandatory arrest, criminal law, police enforcement, uncanny, anxiety, horror,
haunting, specter, private, public, class, 
 
Kelo v. City of New London; Town of Castle Rock v.
Gonzales.
 
INTRODUCTION
 
In this essay, I juxtapose two cases handed down four days apart in October
Term 
 

 
: 
 
Kelo v. City of New London
 
1
 
 and 
 
Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales
 
.
 
2
 
These cases reﬂected on the home and what it means to lose the home. They
also both excited signiﬁcant responses associated with broad-based social
movements. My argument, for those who like to have such things stated
explicitly at the outset, is as follows. I think a key to making sense of the
cases’ meanings is the legal traces of the 
 
uncanny
 
 character of the home. The
uncanny is a literary term meant to capture a dreadful, horrifying feeling that
occurs when the utterly familiar and comfortable (
 
heimlich
 
) becomes unfa-
miliar and frightening (
 
unheimlich
 
) before your very eyes.
 
3
 
 The uncanny is
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the stuff of the house that turns out to be haunted, or Henry James’s children,
or Stephen King’s Maine landscape: something that should be warm and
lovely gone cold and creepy by being viewed again in an obliquely different
though familiar way.
 
4
 
 
What was uncanny in 
 
Kelo
 
 was the changing of the home—comforting
bastion of the middle-class imagination—into property that can be taken and
handed to others. Justice O’Connor deployed the uncanny in her dissenting
account of why the taking in 
 
Kelo
 
 was unconstitutional, classing and gender-
ing the problem of economic development takings. The uncanny in 
 
Castle
Rock
 
 was twofold: First there was the (gendered) horror of the facts, in which
a mother’s children were taken from the home by their father and murdered
despite her desperate pleas to the police to enforce a restraining order prom-
ising protection. Then there was the Supreme Court’s inability to accept the
full implications of the contemporary reformist domestic violence regime
now embraced in established legal circles, that the home should be subject to
public control and the criminal law to private control. The Supreme Court
was whipsawed between the legally uncanny relation between the home and
the criminal law and the factually uncanny terrorizing of the home by the
violent patriarch. 
If the home is the archetypal site of the uncanny, the judicial opinion
presents itself as a genre wholly cabined by norms and rules that resist the
uncanny. Judicial opinions about the home thus become vexed in the
extreme. On the one hand, the “facts” (as lawyers call them) must be pre-
sented, and these reﬂect astonishing realities that defy ordinary language—
in the Supreme Court cases discussed here, the taking and destruction of a
family home, and the murder of three children kidnapped by their father
from the home and care of their mother. On the other hand, the “law”—
which is to say the dense structures of reasoning by text and analogy that
are the lifeblood of legal decisions—strives self-consciously to repress dis-
order, so that the legal results appear inevitable. The difﬁculty of this effort
is manifest in the genre of the judicial opinion, which simultaneously pre-
sents and refutes counterarguments, and often appears alongside a dissent
offering alternative interpretations.
Interdisciplinary work always presents challenges, but law and literature
seems more challenging for lawyers than most. Symposia and anthologies
have been published, and legal luminaries have weighed in on methodol-
ogy. Yet relatively little work takes the straightforward approach I adopt
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here: doctrinally attuned examination of core legal texts—here, Supreme
Court opinions—using a primary method of literary analysis, namely
close reading.
 
5
 
 On the one hand, this approach should be reminiscent of
old-fashioned doctrinal scholarship that engaged in close analysis of the
language of cases in the hopes of understanding more about those decisions
and about the law. On the other hand, my approach cannot fully boast such
traditionalism, as it is informed by literary technique not often used for
legal analysis by legal scholars. Literary scholars have had fewer qualms
about attending to rhetorical practices in legal materials, but for reasons of
disciplinary training, they have usually avoided thorny doctrinal puzzles.
 
6
 
The uncanny haunts the meanings of two Supreme Court opinions
released in the same week, both of which grappled with the concept of home.
Lest we forget, that means that nine justices and thirty-ﬁve law clerks worked
on these cases during precisely the same period of time. To any literary
reader it would be odd to think that such juxtaposition would not affect the
texts produced and the ideas in them. The opinions represent the collective
work of justices aided by law clerks, not to mention the myriad lawyers and
judges who wrote the briefs and the decisions in the lower courts. Along with
the opinions’ production of meaning, the cases’ public reception is a rich vein
to be tapped. And of course an inevitable feature of legal opinions is that they
simultaneously take seriously and take for granted the relation between state
coercion, life and death, and public meanings produced through texts. 
 
I. UNCANNY TAKINGS
A. Home and Hotel
 
In the summer of 
 

 
, an unusual proposal appeared before the 
 

 
,
 

 
 resi-
dents of Weare, New Hampshire. It was a plan to use the rural town’s power
of eminent domain to take an eighteenth-century farmhouse, the home of
one of its residents, and transform it into an inn to be called the Lost Liberty
Hotel.
 
7
 
 The inn would feature a dining room called Just Desserts Café and a
museum open to the public.
 
8
 
 The stated purpose of this proposed taking was
to bring “economic development and higher tax revenue to Weare.”
 
9
 
 
The house was a ramshackle structure on a remote dead-end dirt road.
 
10
 
Its well-liked owner was David Hackett Souter, the town’s most famous resi-
dent. Even at the time of his nomination to the Supreme Court, locals had
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been proudly protective of his privacy.
 
11
 
 Now his unassuming house, which
had once belonged to his grandparents,
 
12
 
 was the focus of a small-town dis-
pute that was garnering national attention.
The cause was the 
 

 
–
 

 
 judgment in 
 
Kelo v. City of New London
 
, in which
Justice Souter had joined the majority of the Court in deciding that economic
development takings did not violate the “public use” requirement of the Tak-
ings Clause.
 
13
 
 The Court held that the Constitution did not prohibit the use
of eminent domain to take private property and transfer it to other private
ownership as part of a development plan to bring economic beneﬁts to the
community. The property owners’ objection that economic development was
not a 
 
public
 
 use met with the Court’s response that that there is “no principled
way of distinguishing economic development from the other public purposes
that we have recognized.”
 
14
 
 Those other public purposes—relieving urban
blight in Washington, D.C., and breaking up oligarchic property ownership
in Hawaii—the Court said, were not substantially different from the eco-
nomic development contemplated in New London.
 
15
 
Doctrinally, the case was signiﬁcant but not pathbreaking.
 
16
 
 Prior cases
had already ruled that taking private property and transferring it to other pri-
vate ownership could be “public use” if it would serve a public purpose. 
 
Kelo
 
did no more than hold that public purpose could also include economic
development, even when there was no blight or property oligopoly to
remove. The decision was not exactly dictated by prior cases, but neither
was it a radical departure.
 
17
 
But the public understood 
 
Kelo
 
 differently. Within days of the decision,
commentators across the country loudly decried it.
 
18
 
 Outrage abounded,
with characterizations such as “terrifying,” “sickening,” and “creepy.”
 
19
 
 The
practical thrust of the response tended to be similar: in almost every state and
innumerable municipalities, spooked citizens proposed laws that would limit
the purposes for which government could take property under the rubric of
“public use.”
 
20
 
 These responses were themselves symbolic to a large degree.
 
21
 
The Lost Liberty Hotel proposal was a quirky variant of this legislatively
oriented protest movement. Ultimately, Weare residents voted not to take
Justice Souter’s home,
 
 
 
and instead urged the New Hampshire state legislature
to forbid the kind of takings 
 
Kelo
 
 held constitutional.
 
22
 
 And it was difﬁcult to
imagine the farmhouse becoming a hotel (who goes to Weare?).
 
23
 
 But the
incident was an intriguing window into the nature of the public response and
the cultural meaning of the case itself. 
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According to the California businessman who came up with the scheme,
the Lost Liberty Hotel had to be built on Justice Souter’s property “because it
is a unique site being the home of someone largely responsible for destroying
property rights for all Americans.”
 
24
 
 The proposal targeted a reclusive justice
with strong roots in his home.
 
25
 
 Going beyond commentary, it aimed to sub-
ject Souter to precisely what 
 
Kelo
 
 permitted—to suggest that if he had con-
templated his own home being taken for economic development, he would
have voted differently.
 
26
 
 
The proposal sought to punish Justice Souter as a private homeowner
for a decision taken in his public role, to assert the inseparability of those
identities. The proposal to use 
 
Kelo
 
 itself to take his home and turn it into a
hotel staged a performance of 
 
Kelo
 
’s destabilization of the private/public
line. A famously private man, known to seek refuge in his home away from
public life in Washington D.C., would be publicly deprived of that private
refuge—ﬁguratively and literally.
 
27
 
 Proposing the transformation of the
Souter home into the Lost Liberty Hotel drew on the uncanny association
of hotels as home substitutes, in between private and public space.
 
28
 
 It
thereby performed the uncanny idea of home as neither private nor public. 
 
B. Class and Values, House and Home
 
There was little surprising to legal academics in the suggestion that “public
use” and “private use” may not be clearly delineated.
 
29
 
 But why did many
Americans experience 
 
Kelo
 
 as a distressing tear in the social fabric needing
swift repair? The substantial outrage 
 
Kelo
 
 occasioned had to do with the
meaning of the home in American social life.
 
30
 
 The basic idea of losing the
home, the center and repository of family life, touched upon a profound
and widespread middle-class anxiety.
 
31
 
 
It is extremely rare for a person to have his home taken by eminent
domain.
 
32
 
 This is not a common problem. The prevalent taker of homes is not
the state but private entities, upon foreclosure by creditors. Home, the sym-
bol of the American Dream, is a focal point of great middle-class anxiety,
often centered on potential loss to foreclosure.
 
33
 
 
 
Kelo
 
’s facts were uncannily
reminiscent of home foreclosure because they involved homes ending up in
the hands of other private parties. The social meaning of home loss is the loss
of a family’s economic stability, and with that the loss of middle-class status.
 
34
 
Kelo
 
 stirred up a fear of falling central to the middle-class psyche.
 
35
 
 But in a
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sense, there was more horror because it was the government’s doing, with
the Supreme Court’s approval.
In referring to the property to be taken from 
 
Kelo
 
’s petitioners, Justice
Stevens’s majority opinion, holding that the economic development taking
was for public use, never used the term “home” at all, but rather “house.”
The word “home” was featured in the opinion twice: once in referring to the
 
new
 
 homes that were to be built upon the taking of blighted property in
Washington, D.C., and once in referring to the homes 
 
newly
 
 purchased by
ordinary people after the taking of oligopolists’ property in Hawaii.
 
36
 
In Justice O’Connor’s dissenting opinion, by contrast, the 
 
Kelo
 
 petition-
ers were “nine resident or investment owners of 
 

 
 homes.”
 
37
 
 Her opinion
used the word “home” eight times throughout, with repeated reference to
the fact that the properties to be taken were homes, even though some of
the houses were owned as investments.
 
38
 
 She began by closely associating a
petitioner with the property to be taken through a series of rhetorical
moves bringing to the surface the home concept:
 
Petitioner Wilhelmina Dery . . . lives in a house in Walbach Street that has been
 
in her family for over 
 

 
 years
 
. She was 
 
born
 
 in the house in 
 

 
; her husband,
petitioner Charles Dery, moved into the house when they 
 
married
 
 in 
 

 
. 
 
Their
son
 
 lives next door with 
 
his
 
 
 
family
 
 in the house he received as a 
 
wedding gift
 
. . . .
 
39
 
This introductory description of the lawsuit featured the major events
that comprise the multigenerational life cycles of a family—birth, mar-
riage, rearing children, children’s marriage, and grandchildren. Thus when
Justice O’Connor pointed out that “the homes of three plaintiffs . . . are to
be demolished,” and described the lawsuit as an effort “[t]o save their
homes,” it was as if to suggest that the physical structure housed a family
life accreted over generations.
 
40
 
 The meaning of the taking then was the
destruction of Family. 
Moreover, the takings were presented as marking the passing of a way of
life in which people lived in the house where they were born and married,
where their parents and grandparents lived. Justice O’Connor’s nostalgic reci-
tation located the Dery family in their New England house for over a century,
whereas the average person in today’s America changes residences every few
years.
 
41
 
 The details she mentioned also marked the family as white people
who had been in America since the nineteenth century.
 
42
 
 In this respect, the
family she showcased was somewhat unusual, resonating obliquely with the
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post-
 
Kelo
 
 public attention to Justice Souter, whose ancestors, including several
 
Mayﬂower
 
 passengers, had lived in New England for centuries.
 
43
 
 
Justice O’Connor, herself a skilled mythmaker of home and family vir-
tue, had recently co-authored with her brother an autobiographical narra-
tive about her family’s ranch where she lived from birth through early
childhood, and where she later always returned.
 
44
 
 This ranch—the name of
which was the book’s title, 
 
Lazy B
 
—was in her family since the nineteenth
century for over a hundred years.
 
45
 
 Her parents lived there from their mar-
riage until their deaths.
 
46
 
 Her focus on the Derys and the facts that she saw
ﬁt to mention in 
 
Kelo
 
 recall her construction of her family’s ranch as the
site of autochthonous family life and upbringing rooted in a place, imbued
with values, and connected to the past. She writes of how the “power of the
memories of life” on the ranch:
 
[s]urges through my mind and my heart often. . . . We know that our characters
were shaped by our experiences there. . . . The value system we learned was
simple and unsophisticated and the product of necessity. What counted was
competence and the ability to do whatever was required to maintain the ranch
operation in good working order. . . . Verbal skills were less important than the
ability to know and understand how things work in the physical world. Personal
qualities of honesty, dependability, competence, and good humor were valued
most.
 
47
 
Note the telling emphasis on the central role of the home in shaping a
person; the valorizing of a stripped-down, hardworking, unpretentious
way of life; and the paramount virtue of physical work and connection to
the land. The mythmaking nostalgia here is about the home’s “simple and
unsophisticated” values where children are raised to become grounded,
honest, modest Americans of good solid character. She believed that these
ingrained values were “due to the life created for us by our parents” on the
ranch,48 which she clung to as “a never-changing anchor in a world of
uncertainties.”49 This is a powerful vision of what home can mean and do to
a person in the world. 
O’Connor tells of a “heart-wrenching time for all the family” when
eventually there remained “no family member . . . interested in making the
ranch his or her home.”50 She suggests that the government’s tightening
regulations on cattle ranching affected the viability of keeping the ranch in
the family:51 
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We thought it would always be there, that our children and our children’s chil-
dren would know it as we did. We knew that no matter how far we had traveled,
we were still welcome there. . . . The decision to sell, to let the ranch go, was so
difﬁcult that I still avoid confronting it directly. I fear returning to the ranch and
seeing it in other hands and with all its changes.52
If she avowedly avoided confronting the unsettling sight of her family’s
home in other hands and transformed into something else, she encountered
the idea at least indirectly in Kelo, where the petitioners stood to have their
homes taken for transformation and use by others. 
C. Gendering Takings
Poignantly in Kelo, Justice O’Connor ventriloquized the petitioners’ argu-
ment that though “the government may take their homes” for, say, railroads,
it may not take them for “the private use of other owners simply because the
new owners may make more productive use of the property.”53 She speciﬁ-
cally pointed to petitioners Susette Kelo and Wilhelmina Dery, remarking
that they had “well-maintained homes”—in other words, middle class (not
blighted).54 The wrongness of giving these women’s homes to more produc-
tive users was evident: “For who among us can say she already makes the
most productive or attractive possible use of her property?”55 
With this Justice O’Connor added gender to class in critiquing eco-
nomic development takings. Her formulation hinted at the phenomenon of
keeping up with the Joneses. It sounded like she was channeling an earnest
homemaker on the impossibility of reaching a Martha Stewart-type ideal.
And not for lack of trying. She just hadn’t “already” gotten there and nei-
ther had her neighbor. This evinced a sense of what it means to be middle
class—aspiring, hoping to do even better, implicitly in competition with
others. The “us” in Justice O’Connor’s rhetorical question was middle-
class homemakers, explicitly female maintainers of the private sphere.56
These women’s homes were being deemed not productive or attractive
enough compared to other uses that would beneﬁt the public. This case was
not just business. It was personal.
Justice O’Connor’s dissent took umbrage on behalf of middle-class Amer-
ican housewives and their way of life. She managed to imply that taking the
home because other uses would be more productive or attractive was to dis-
respect the average homemaker who is decently caring for her home and
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family. If property is associated with male ownership, and the house as a cas-
tle is associated with a man, the home is associated with women. Her dissent
implied a woman’s perspective on the taking.57 Justice O’Connor accordingly
shifted the focus from the idea of property to the idea of home, itself implic-
itly gendered—that was what mattered.
Susette Kelo and Wilhelmina Dery, middle-class white homemakers
maintaining their homes, simply did not make sense as people whose prop-
erty would be taken for public purpose. Justice Thomas reminded us in his
own dissent: “Urban renewal projects have long been associated with the
displacement of blacks; ‘[i]n cities across the country, urban renewal came
to be known as “Negro removal.”’”58 Indeed he predicted that the future
harm of Kelo, including “the indignity inﬂicted by uprooting [individuals]
from their homes,” would fall on poor and minority communities who are
“systematically less likely to put their lands to the highest and best social
use. . . .”59 But Justice O’Connor’s approach acknowledged the permissibil-
ity of takings where poor persons’ property use was actively harming mid-
dle-class social and economic aspirations through the creation of urban
blight, or where rich oligopolists were impeding the middle-class dream of
owning one’s own home.60 
The trouble for Justice O’Connor was the idea that the state could
“replac[e] any Motel  with a Ritz-Carlton, any home with a shopping
mall, or any farm with a factory.”61 In this parade of displacement, the
“simple and unsophisticated” values that she associated with her roots
appear62—in the motley tropes of Motel , home, and farm—in direct con-
trast to things that too often supersede those values in modern society: cos-
mopolitan upscale luxury, suburbanized consumerism, and industrialized
estrangement from an agrarian past—sometimes known as economic
development.
D. Specter of Condemnation
The anxiety of middle-class status resonates with home as the symbol of
the all-important public-private line that underlies the notion of property.
Kelo, according to Justice O’Connor, “wash[ed] out any distinction
between private and public use of property.”63 She reasoned that “[t]he
trouble with economic development takings is that private beneﬁt and inci-
dental public beneﬁt are, by deﬁnition, merged and mutually reinforcing.”64
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If any private-to-private transfer of property that beneﬁted the public
could easily be recast as having a public purpose, the private-public line
was rendered so manipulable as to be erased. 
Justice O’Connor stated it dramatically: “The specter of condemnation
hangs over all property.”65 Condemnation in property language has two
obvious meanings: The ﬁrst is the exercise of eminent domain. The second is
the pronouncement of a structure as unﬁt for habitation. The implicit judg-
ment that a home, however well maintained, is not productive or attractive
enough to be saved partakes of both of these meanings. It was as if the bour-
geois institution of the home were being destroyed precisely by being sub-
jected to the considerations about economic productivity from which home is
imagined to be the refuge.66 
The adage that a man’s house is his castle suggests a middle-class person at
home on a par with any rich man, even the king.67 Home renders a person a
king in important part because the home is a bulwark against even the king’s
intrusion.68 It would not be too much to say that it is difﬁcult to imagine the
middle-class person’s rights and status without the concept of the home. Jus-
tice O’Connor’s home discourse drew out the bond between bourgeois status
and private property.
The home emerged as the center around which revolved the intimately
linked anxieties about middle-class status and the private-public distinction.
As a doctrinal matter, of course, Kelo was not about the home in particular, as
its holding applied to any private property.69 The problem was not the taking
of a home for public use. It was rather that the home, the archetype of prop-
erty, was the site of the turning of the public-private distinction on its head.
But the public reaction to Kelo transcended actual fear of condemnation,
inchoate class interest, or abstract investment in the public-private dis-
tinction. It manifested a barely repressed dread in the middle-class
thought-world, the dread of home loss. In this light, Kelo was downright
unhomely. The “specter of condemnation” was the anxiety of loss of middle-
class status that hangs over the home and is embodied in it. 
The image of a “specter” here bears another look. A specter is a ghost
that haunts. A home that is not a refuge is haunted—haunted by anxiety of
its own destruction. Justice O’Connor seemed to ﬁgure the Kelo decision
itself as a kind of uncanny, ghostly presence haunting the home. The urge
to overturn Kelo is the urge to exorcise the home by keeping the private
private and the public public. The likely unconscious reference to the
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beginning of The Communist Manifesto (“A spectre is haunting Europe—
the spectre of communism.”) then resonates with the haunting warning of
the destruction of private property.70 
II. UNCANNY PROPERTY
A. Horror Story
Days after the Kelo decision, another constitutional case in its own way
engaged the Court in unsettling property notions surrounding the home.
Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales had the most uncanny facts possible: the mur-
der of children by their father when the police failed to enforce a domestic
abuse restraining order.71 The legal question was whether the government’s
failure to enforce the order was a deprivation of . . . yes, property.
Jessica Gonzales had obtained a domestic abuse restraining order com-
manding her husband not to “molest or disturb the peace of” his wife and
children, and to stay at least  yards from the family home.72 The order
directed the police that they “shall use every reasonable means to enforce”
the order, and “shall arrest” or seek an arrest warrant if they had probable
cause to believe the order had been violated.73
One day, her husband went to the family home and abducted his three
daughters from the lawn where they were playing.74 Jessica called the police to
request enforcement of the order, but despite ﬁve calls over almost ﬁve hours
and a visit to the police station, the police did not attempt to arrest her hus-
band.75 Nearly eight hours after her ﬁrst call, her husband went to the station,
opened ﬁre with a semiautomatic weapon, and was immediately shot dead.76
Their murdered daughters were in the back of his pickup truck.77 
These dreadful events from the annals of domestic violence wherein an
abusive father became murderous seem to verge on a horror story. In the
last thirty years, the iconic cultural image of the father who goes mad and
terrorizes the family is Jack Nicholson’s face as Jack Torrance in Stanley
Kubrick’s ﬁlm The Shining, chopping an ax through the door in pursuit of
his wife.78 The home is the Overlook Hotel, where Jack is a new care-
taker, and he and his wife and son are isolated there during the winter
off-season. He has been told that a previous caretaker of this hotel had
gone crazy of cabin fever and brutally killed his wife, his two young
daughters, and himself. 
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That Jack is a caretaker of the hotel rather than a proper patriarch in his
own home allegorizes the failures and disappointments of modern familial
masculinity. The classic genre of the haunted house lends to frightening
reﬂection here on anxieties of the American middle-class family.79 The haunt-
ing of the hotel—uncannily both home and not home80—converges in the
ﬁlm with our culture’s exemplary domestic horror: the destruction of the
family by the violence of the patriarch.81 The ﬁgure meant to provide for the
home’s safety turns out to be the most terrifying threat to it.
B. A Private Right to the Police?
As I have argued elsewhere, an important feature of the criminal law of
domestic violence (“DV”) today is the criminal law’s treatment of an
abuser’s presence in the home as a proxy for DV, through the issuance and
enforcement of restraining orders.82 A crucial piece of the contemporary
DV enforcement regime is mandatory arrest for restraining order viola-
tions, which produces an expectation of police supervision, to ensure that
the violent husband stays away from the home. The claim that the
Supreme Court addressed in Castle Rock unfolded this expectation to its
logical conclusion. The case arose when Jessica Gonzales sued the town of
Castle Rock for damages, on the theory that the failure to enforce her
restraining order violated federal constitutional due process.83 Ultimately,
the Supreme Court had to resolve whether a recipient of a DV restraining
order has a constitutionally protected property right to its enforcement by
the police.
To understand how the DV regime we have today plausibly raises such a
question, it is necessary ﬁrst to recall that the DV restraining order reallo-
cates property in the home.84 The restraining order typically bans its subject’s
presence in the family home. The exclusion of a husband means the corre-
sponding conferral on a wife of the exclusive right of possession.85 The restrain-
ing order thus functions as conferral of a property interest that is enforced by
criminal law.86 
DV mandatory arrest laws that require the police to arrest upon probable
cause for restraining order violations aim for mandatory criminal enforce-
ment of this property reallocation. The purpose is to have the police maintain
the abuser’s exclusion, and leave the police without discretion to treat the
abuser’s presence other than as a crime. The goal is to overcome the distinctive
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problems associated with DV enforcement, including the traditional reluc-
tance of the police to intervene in family quarrels and a DV victim’s typical
doubts about whether she wants her husband treated as a criminal.87 To that
end, it becomes necessary for the police to enforce the taking of the home
from the violent man and the exclusive conferral on the abused woman of the
right to possess the home—the state’s solution to the domestic horror. 
The context for Castle Rock is thus a DV regime that reallocates rights to
possess the home and makes criminal enforcement of that property realloca-
tion mandatory. The Tenth Circuit sitting en banc held that a recipient of a
DV restraining order had a protected property interest in its enforcement by
the police, and that failure to enforce it was deprivation of property without
due process.88 Thus Jessica Gonzales could win her suit for damages against
the town if the facts were established. 
The Tenth Circuit framed the issue within the doctrinal lens of procedural
due process,89 relying on the line of cases in which the Supreme Court had
recognized that certain state-created property entitlements may not be taken
away without due process.90 The particular entitlement at stake in this case
was police enforcement, which the Tenth Circuit thought comparable to
other government services that the Supreme Court had previously deemed
protected property interests, such as a free education, continued utility ser-
vice, and welfare or disability beneﬁts.91 The restraining order, the Tenth
Circuit reasoned, commanded enforcement, using mandatory language that
limited police discretion, as did the state mandatory arrest statutes.92 
“Recogniz[ing] domestic abuse as an exceedingly important social ill,”93
the Tenth Circuit noted, the legislature had aimed “to alter the fact that the
police were not enforcing domestic abuse restraining orders.”94 Changing
this law enforcement norm was a means to “attack the domestic violence
problems” proper, with the goal of holding the “perpetrator . . . accountable
for his actions,” and making the “victim . . . feel safe.”95 The court concluded
that the restraining order and the mandatory arrest statutes together created a
protected property interest in police enforcement that the state could not
deny without due process.96 
The initially surprising idea that a DV restraining order confers a prop-
erty right to police enforcement is not so surprising when viewed in light
of the expectation of police supervision of the home that the DV regime
creates. Since the restraining order’s property-reallocating function is a
key component of DV enforcement, a recipient of an order is a recipient of
LAL2003_01  Page 303  Monday, October 20, 2008  10:14 AM
This content downloaded from 140.247.226.82 on Thu, 1 Aug 2013 12:30:41 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions304
Law & Literature •  Volume 20, Number 3
a state-conferred property interest in the home. If the party from whom the
state has taken the property interest does not abide by the reallocation, man-
datory arrest laws require the police to arrest him.
It then becomes a very plausible further step to see the recipient of the
order as having not only a right to exclusive possession of the home, but
also a right to police enforcement of that reallocation of property. After all,
without enforcement, what good is the order?97 It is as if the idea of property
were contagious, moving from a right in the home to a right in police
enforcement of a right in the home. Thus witness a slide from an expectation
that the police will enforce state-conferred property rights in the home to a
conception of criminal law enforcement in the home as a property right.
What emerges out of the expectation of police supervision in the home is
the ultimate solution to the horror of domestic violence. The DV restraining
order becomes a kind of super-property: property given to the victim by the
state with the mandatory promise to protect and arrest. That is the answer to
the anxiety of the violent destruction of the home. One can then construe the
failure of enforcement as a deprivation of property that the state had previ-
ously conferred: the safe home promised.
C. Reaction
All this may sound reassuring as a legal denouement to a domestic horror
story. But the Supreme Court reedited the ﬁlm to produce a different result.
Justice Scalia, writing for a Court of seven justices over the dissent of Justice
Stevens (joined by Justice Ginsburg), reversed the Tenth Circuit and held
that a restraining order does not confer a property right to police enforce-
ment. Even in rejecting such a right as a matter of federal constitutional due
process, the Court struggled with the well-accepted logic of the DV manda-
tory arrest regime that had led to the lower court’s conclusion that a restrain-
ing order creates a property right to police enforcement. 
The Court acknowledged that DV mandatory arrest statutes were often
considered more mandatory than traditional mandatory arrest statutes, but
emphasized that even so, the police still retained discretion in particular
instances.98 Language providing that the police “shall use every means to
enforce a restraining order” was not strong enough to make police enforce-
ment actually mandatory, and therefore could not create a constitutional
entitlement to enforcement.99
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Women’s advocates condemned Castle Rock as an appalling repudiation of
DV reform efforts over the last thirty years, not to mention a dangerous rul-
ing for battered women.100 DV mandatory arrest laws were supposed to take
away police discretion not to arrest. Justice Stevens’s dissent recounted that
“[s]tates passed a wave of these statutes in the ’s and ’s with the
unmistakable goal of eliminating police discretion in this area.”101 The Court
seemed to be rejecting this widespread understanding of a major DV reform
goal.102 A conference held in the wake of Castle Rock was called “Some are
Guilty—All are Accountable: Accountability in the Age of Denial.” The
advert called the Court’s decision “shocking for its message to survivors,
advocates, scholars and state actors that ‘shall’ really didn’t mean shall at
all. . . . [T]he majority marginalized the legislative history of thirty-two juris-
dictions that enacted mandatory legislation and rendered invisible the pain of
battered women and that of a movement.”103 The academic commentary on
Castle Rock has been similarly critical.104 But a contrary ruling in Castle Rock
might predictably have led to a tightening of issuance of DV restraining
orders, as governments came to terms with the restraining order’s creation of
an entitlement that left them open to suits for damages, contingent in each
instance on unpredictable acts of violent individuals. Abuse victims might
well have faced a higher bar to obtaining orders than they currently do, and
hence increased danger. Thus the wish to have DV mandatory arrest laws
declared truly mandatory had a symbolic dimension for the DV movement
that was not only about protecting DV victims from harm.
The Supreme Court in Castle Rock gestured toward the possibility that
truly mandatory language, if adopted, might well create an entitlement to
police enforcement.105 It was true that the denial of federal constitutional lia-
bility did not block states from creating and imposing liability in their own
spheres.106 The decision did spawn public calls for state legislative action.107 
But in dicta, the Court indicated that even if state legislatures strength-
ened the mandatory language, it still might not be prepared to ﬁnd federal
constitutional liability. That is, even if the police were clearly divested of any
discretion, that still might not mean that an individual had an entitlement to
have the police perform an arrest.108 The reason? “The serving of public rather
than private ends is the normal course of the criminal law. . . .”109 Presenting a
conception of criminal law as having public purpose, the Court stated that
private harm must be subordinated to the public purpose of criminal law.110
The notion of a private right to criminal enforcement was anathema. 
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But feminists had long struggled to impress upon the public that the
interest in combating violence in the “private” sphere of the home was just
as “public” as the states’ enforcement of criminal law in public space.111 The
goal had been to locate DV fully in the ambit of criminal law and to have
DV treated as a public matter. As DV has increasingly attained that sought-
after public status, there remains little of the past doubt about whether DV
is a crime. Legislatures, prosecutors, judges, and the public now do see DV
as a public harm that should appropriately be addressed, often on a manda-
tory basis, by the criminal law.112 
This acceptance enabled the en banc Tenth Circuit and two dissenting
Justices of the Supreme Court to see police enforcement of DV restraining
orders as nondiscretionary and thus something a private individual could
claim was a state-created entitlement. Much of Justice Stevens’s dissent
agreeing with the Tenth Circuit faithfully recited the DV movement’s tenets
with respect to mandatory arrest laws’ goal to break down the perceived
public-private wall that long justiﬁed police non-enforcement of DV.113
The historic rise of the public-purpose conception of DV enforcement
must be juxtaposed with the Supreme Court’s resistance to the notion of a
private entitlement to police enforcement. If a DV restraining order viola-
tion is to be enforced by the police with arrest, then that is a public rather
than a private matter. To accept the public purpose of DV enforcement was
to think of DV as part of criminal law enforcement. A private suit for dam-
ages based on the failure to enforce criminal law seemed, to Justice Scalia,
obviously inconsistent with the idea that criminal law vindicates the public
interest. 
Indeed, the Court suggested further that even if state law did create a pri-
vate entitlement to police enforcement, that entitlement still might not consti-
tute “property” for purposes of federal constitutional due process.114 The
logic of this dictum was that a private party’s interest would be arising “inci-
dentally” out of the traditional government function of arresting criminals.115
In other words, while criminal law (of trespass, burglary, and robbery, for
example) ordinarily does enforce private property rights, it had never con-
ferred on crime victims what I have above called a super-property right—a
property right to enforcement of the criminal law.116 The Court’s resistance
to super-property was based on the selfsame premise to which DV advocates
were committed: that DV is crime, and that criminal law serves public rather
than private interests. Jessica Gonzales’s claim thus ran headlong into the
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legal uncanniness of conceiving a private right to something as quintessen-
tially public as police enforcement of criminal law.
D. Haunted Houses
The claim that nonenforcement of the order was a deprivation speciﬁcally of
property drew upon a meaning that the DV restraining order entails in the
legal system today: the state is supposed to ensure a DV victim her home—its
safety, security, comfort, and protection. In this story, the state gave her
exclusive possession of the family home by way of the restraining order. The
state then had to ensure that she possessed the home and that her husband
stayed away so the family would be secure. And ﬁnally, the state took the
home from her by failing to provide the promised protection. Taking away
that promised protection was in effect taking away the home. Thus it was like
deprivation of property.
Couching police enforcement of a DV restraining order as a property
right, as the Tenth Circuit en banc did, was a logical extension of the view
that a DV victim’s security in her home necessitates not only police enforce-
ment, as with other criminal law, but mandatory enforcement. The notion
that she had a super-property right reﬂected the way in which the home, the
archetype of private property, was increasingly reconceived as a space in
which public supervision was expected. The battered woman’s home space
could be understood to be conferred, maintained, and supervised by the
public. The domestic horror was without question a public matter. Thus
when the violent patriarch went crazy and murdered the children, the state’s
failure to prevent it was the wrong. Because the state had issued a restraining
order against him, the state was effectively deemed responsible for the harm
that a violent person could possibly inﬂict.
The DV movement has had much success in convincing legal actors of the
public nature of private violence. Thus we might wonder why the seven Jus-
tices of the Castle Rock majority did not take the legally plausible approach
adopted below by the Tenth Circuit en banc and two dissenting Supreme
Court Justices. An answer is suggested by considering how thoroughly the
logic of the restraining order in a DV mandatory enforcement regime envi-
sions the home as appropriately subject to state supervision and control in
service of the public interest: a home is made public, but with the purpose of
protecting a private woman. In this regime, the home could be taken (from the
LAL2003_01  Page 307  Monday, October 20, 2008  10:14 AM
This content downloaded from 140.247.226.82 on Thu, 1 Aug 2013 12:30:41 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions308
Law & Literature •  Volume 20, Number 3
husband) and given (to the wife) in the public interest. But ironically, public
failure to enforce that allocation gave rise to a claim for damages that revealed
the purpose of public supervision and control as essentially a private one.
Kelo’s four dissenting Justices (O’Connor, Rehnquist, Scalia, and Tho-
mas) were avowed maintainers of the conceptual public-private line upon
which the system of private property was thought to rest. For them, private
property could be taken for public use; but public purpose and private pur-
pose had to be meaningfully distinct from each other. These four Justices,
along with more liberal Justices Kennedy, Souter, and Breyer, formed the
majority in Castle Rock, decided days later. Perhaps similarly, the criminal
law’s treatment of the home—that symbolic bastion of private property—as
within public supervision and control, for the purpose of an entitled private
person, was uncanny. Private property taken for public purpose was comfort-
able enough. But the home as public property taken and maintained for pri-
vate purpose? That was uncanny.
The uncanny specter that haunted the home in Kelo was home loss, and
in  Castle Rock it was home violence. The home is simultaneously the
source of security against those anxieties and the focal point of those anxi-
eties. The state is at once the solution and the problem. The imaginative
stakes here lie in the relation between the home and the police. Would the
expectation of the state’s full control of the home become an accepted legal
commonplace? The resistance of the Castle Rock majority to a property right
to police enforcement partook of anxiety also evinced in the Kelo dissent—
that through fancy manipulation of concepts of public and private, the home
became so thoroughly subject to the public interest that perhaps it would be
as public as, or more public than, the public streets. The home was haunted
by the specter of becoming at once the exemplary private and the exemplary
public space in the contemporary legal imagination—a specter that was
raised by the legal response to uncanny facts of home destruction through
condemnation and violence. 
CONCLUSION: UNCANNY CHIASMUS 
Out of the juxtaposition of Kelo and Castle Rock emerges a paired chiasmus.117
Kelo was supposed to be about the taking of private property for a public pur-
pose. Justice O’Connor’s dissent suggested not merely the much-vaunted eli-
sion of private and public, but outright reversal, wherein the home effectively
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became “public” property, used for “private” purpose. She translated the
meaning of this conceptual crossing into a gendered middle-class anxiety that
haunts the American home. In Castle Rock, the Tenth Circuit en banc deci-
sion had in effect recognized the violent home as “public” in the sense of
being under government supervision, and nevertheless viewed the police as
having an essentially “private” purpose to protect it. But all the same, this
crossing from private home/public criminal law to public home/private
criminal law was uncanny, even as a legal response to the horror of the
destructively violent father who terrorizes the home. The Supreme Court
found it necessary to reverse it. 
In both cases the home was haunted by the crisscrossing of private and
public—the specter of condemnation, the fear of falling, the violent patri-
arch. The uncanny was the byproduct. If the word unheimlich, or unhomely,
suggests the home as archetypal site of the uncanny, these cases together
reveal the legal uncanny that home can uniquely produce.118 Law makes and
unmakes the home. And the law of the home is uncanny law.
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vate use continued to erode into the early years of the twentieth century.”); see also Nicholas Wil-
liam Haddad, “Public Use or Private Beneﬁt? The Post-Kelo Intersection of Religious Land Use
and the Public Use Doctrine,”  Fordham Law Review ,  () (“Despite general accep-
tance of the notion that the public use requirement imposes at least some substantive limitations on
government takings, there is no bright-line rule as to the distinction between private and public
uses.”); John M. Zuck, “Kelo v. City of New London: Despite the Outcry, the Decision Is Firmly Sup-
ported by Precedent—However, Eminent Domain Critics Still Have Gained Ground,”  Univer-
sity of Memphis Law Review ,  () (“Kelo, while controversial and overwhelmingly
viewed in a negative light, said almost nothing new.”). 
. See Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Fragile Middle Class:
Americans in Debt (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, ),  (“Homeownership is the
status to which most Americans aspire. . . . Homeowners are widely regarded as the backbone of a
large and stable group that will mow lawns, support local schools, worship regularly, pick up litter,
obey trafﬁc laws, and perform the thousand acts of responsibility that weld a community
together.”); Elizabeth Warren, “The Economics of Race: When Making It to the Middle Is Not
Enough,”  Washington and Lee Law Review ,  () (“For most middle class Americans,
both social and economic life center around the home. . . . Over time, homes become repositories
of the families’ collective memories, serving as a silent reminder of the children who grew up and
the adults who aged in these rooms.”); Elizabeth Warren, “The Growing Threat to Middle Class
Families,”  Brooklyn Law Review ,  () (suggesting “homeownership is the emblem of
achieving middle class respectability”).
. Cf. Corinne Calfee, “Kelo v. City of New London: The More Things Stay the Same, The More They
Change,”  Ecology Law Quarterly ,  (). (“Kelo involved white, middle-class petition-
ers, and this image evoked more nationwide concern for property rights than have other condem-
nations.”); David A. Dana, “The Law and Expressive Meaning of Condemning the Poor after
Kelo,”  Northwestern University Law Review ,  () (noting that Kelo spawned public
outrage because it involved condemnation of middle-class homes); Wendell E. Pritchett, “Beyond
Kelo: Thinking about Urban Development in the st Century,”  Georgia State University Law
Review , – () (“Given America’s obsession with homeownership, it is hardly surpris-
ing that an overwhelming majority of the public is concerned that the government may take the
homes of fellow citizens.”). 
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. See, e.g., Marc B. Mihaly, “Living in the Past: The Kelo Court and Public-Private Economic Rede-
velopment,”  Ecology Law Quarterly ,  () (characterizing condemnation under eminent
domain as “rare and expensive”).
. See Elizabeth Warren & Amelia Warren Tyagi, “What’s Hurting the Middle Class,” Boston Review,
Sept./Oct.  (“It is middle-class homeowners who lose their houses to foreclosure—people
who once saved enough money for a down payment, and who survived the most rigorous credit
screen imposed in consumer ﬁnancial markets.”). The mortgage crisis has recently turned this
latent anxiety into widespread disastrous reality. See Manny Fernandez, “Helping to Keep Homeless-
ness at Bay as Foreclosures Hit More Families,” New York Times, Feb. , , at B (“The situation
has upended the very deﬁnition of the needy, as working-class families in tree-lined, middle-class
neighborhoods go from being homeowners to homeless in a matter of months. The transition comes
not only as a psychological and emotional shock, but a ﬁnancial one, too.”); Brad Heath & Charisse
Jones, “In Denver, Foreclosures and a Dramatic Exodus,” USA Today, Apr. , , at A (“For
hundreds of homeowners in this mostly middle-class corner of Denver—and an estimated . million
more nationwide—the wave of foreclosures battering U.S. ﬁnancial markets is quickly unraveling the
American dream. Those who have lost homes here describe seeing their lives crumble into anxiety and
embarrassment.”); John Kerry, Op-Ed., “Mortgage Crisis Calls for Defense: Nobody Wins with
Foreclosures,” Boston Herald, Feb. , , at  (“Each time a home is foreclosed upon, a family’s
economic dream lies in tatters and neglected buildings can bring urban blight and destroy entire
neighborhoods.”); Brigid Schulte, “‘My House. My Dream. It Was All an Illusion.’: Latina’s Loss in
Va. Epitomizes Mortgage Crisis,” Washington Post, Mar. , , at A (describing foreclosure expe-
rience of former Alexandria resident who “no longer dreams of owning a home in America”). 
. Carrie Teegardin, Ann Hardie & Alan Judd, “Swift Foreclosures Dash American Dream,” Atlanta
Journal-Constitution, Jan. , , at A (“‘When a family loses its home, the children are taken out
of school, the family’s greatest hope for long-term economic stability is lost, the retirement fund
that was going to be the paid-off house has disappeared.’”) (quoting Elizabeth Warren).
. See Barbara Ehrenreich, Fear of Falling: The Inner Life of the Middle Class (New York: Pantheon,
).
. Kelo v. City of New London,  U.S. ,  n. () (quoting Berman on the need in that case
“to redesign the whole area so as to eliminate the conditions that cause slums . . . so that a balanced,
integrated plan could be developed for the region, including not only new homes, but also schools,
churches, parks, streets, and shopping centers”) (emphasis added); id. at  (demonstrating that
“the government’s pursuit of a public purpose will often beneﬁt individual private parties,” with the
example that “in Midkiff, the forced transfer of property conferred a direct and signiﬁcant beneﬁt
on those lessees who were previously unable to purchase their homes”) (emphasis added).
. Id. at  (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
. Id. at –, , .
. Id. at – (emphases added).
. Id. at .
. A  U.S. Census Bureau survey indicates that the median year that a householder moved into a
unit was . Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Am. Community Survey, at Table
No. B ().
. The petitioners’ brief stated that Wilhelmina Dery’s family came from Italy in the s. See Brief
of Petitioners at –, Kelo v. City of New London,  U.S.  () (No. -). Cf. also Cal-
fee, supra note , at  (“Kelo involved white, middle-class petitioners”); Pritchett, supra note ,
at  (stating the homes in Kelo were “owned by white, middle-class residents”).
. See Yarbrough, supra note , at .
. See Sandra Day O’Connor & H. Alan Day, Lazy B (New York: Random House, ), , –,
–.
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. Id. at viii, –.
. Id. at xi.
. Id. at .
. Id. at .
. Id. at .
. Id. at –.
. Id. at  (discussing the increasing bureaucracy involved in public-land grazing due to Bureau of
Land Management regulations such as decreasing the numbers of cattle ranchers could run).
. Id. at .
. Kelo v. City of New London,  U.S. ,  () (O’Connor, J., dissenting). See also Richard
A. Epstein, “Kelo: An American Original: Of Grubby Particulars and Grand Principles,”  Green
Bag d ,  () (“For most people, the key question was whether a man’s home is his castle,
for which the naïve answer is yes, except when property is used for traditional public purposes such
as roads and parks.”)
. Kelo,  U.S. at  (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
. Id. at .
. Cf. Betty Friedan, The Feminine Mystique (New York: Dell, ). 
. Cf. Peggy Cooper Davis & Carol Gilligan, “A Woman Decides: Justice O’Connor and Due Pro-
cess Rights of Choice,”  McGeorge Law Review ,  () (reading Justice O’Connor in
light of Carol Gilligan’s In a Different Voice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, ), and
arguing that O’Connor’s “reproductive rights jurisprudence has revealed strengths that have to
do with gender”).
. Kelo,  U.S. at  (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Wendell E. Pritchett, “The ‘Public Menace’
of Blight: Urban Renewal and the Private Uses of Eminent Domain,”  Yale Law and Policy
Review ,  ()).
. Id. at –. For discussions of class implications of Kelo, see David J. Barron & Gerald E. Frug,
“Make Eminent Domain Fair for All,” Boston Globe, Aug. , , at A (warning that proposed
federal legislation post-Kelo would “provide protection for those living in middle-class and wealthy
neighborhoods while placing no additional limits on the use of eminent domain in poor neighbor-
hoods”); Dana, supra note ; Ilya Somin, “Is Post-Kelo Eminent Domain Reform Bad for the Poor?,”
 Northwestern University Law Review ,  () (asserting that a “law that protects the prop-
erty rights of most but not all of the population is preferable to one that protects no one”).
. See Kelo,  U.S. at  (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (afﬁrming that “in certain circumstances and to
meet certain exigencies, takings that serve a public purpose also satisfy the Constitution even if the
property is destined for subsequent private use”) (citing Berman v. Parker,  U.S.  (), and
Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff,  U.S.  ()). Justice O’Connor was not on the Court when
Berman was decided, but she authored the majority opinion in Midkiff, explicitly authorizing tak-
ings in the oligopolist context. Cf. Dana, supra note , at  (“The media, commentators, and
(most importantly) legislators have revolted against the Kelo condemnations, however, while they
quietly approved or at least accepted the Berman condemnation.”). 
. Kelo,  U.S. at  (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
. O’Connor & Day, supra note , at .
. Kelo,  U.S. at  (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
. Id. at .
. Id. at .
. See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, “Home as Work: The First Woman’s Rights Claims Concerning Wives’
Household Labor, –,”  Yale Law Journal ,  () (“The market was a male
sphere of competitive self-seeking, while the home was celebrated as a female sphere, a site of spir-
itual uplift that offered relief from the vicissitudes of market struggle.”). 
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. Cf. Joseph William Singer, “The Ownership Society and Takings of Property: Castles, Invest-
ments, and Just Obligations,”  Harvard Environmental Law Review ,  () (“The most
common image of property is the castle.”). 
. See, e.g., Miller v. U.S.  U.S. ,  () (invoking an assertion attributed to William Pitt,
“The poorest man may in his cottage bid deﬁance to all the forces of the Crown. It may be frail; its
roof may shake; the wind may blow through it; the storm may enter; the rain may enter; but the
King of England cannot enter—all his force dares not cross the threshold of the ruined tenement!”). 
. Cf. D. Benjamin Barros, “Home as a Legal Concept,”  Santa Clara Law Review , –
() (arguing that it was “surprising and disappointing” that the Court in Kelo “did not even dis-
cuss the possibility that homes could be treated differently than other types of property in the emi-
nent domain context”).
. Karl Marx & Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto (). Cf. Richard Posner, “Foreword: A
Political Court,”  Harvard Law Review , n. () (noting the echo). 
.  U.S.  (). 
. Id. at .
. Id. at . The permanent order gave the father some visitation rights and parenting time on
arrangement by the parties. See Gonzales v. City of Castle Rock,  F.d ,  (th Cir.
) (en banc). 
. Castle Rock,  U.S. at .
. Id. at –.
. Id. at .
. Id.
. The Shining (Warner Bros. Pictures, ), based on Stephen King, The Shining (New York: Dou-
bleday, ).
. Here I refer to the American gothic tradition. See, e.g., Edgar Allen Poe, The Fall of the House of
Usher (); Nathaniel Hawthorne, The House of the Seven Gables ().
. See Lewis & Cho, supra note , at  (stating that the hotel “promises to relieve us of the home’s
most troubling aspect, namely, the fact of its existence as property” that “must be cared for, main-
tained, and upheld,” but that “the ownership we attempt to escape often returns, like the repressed
itself, as the hotel’s most disconcerting aspect. We need only recall the terrible memory of ﬁnding a
stain on the hotel bed’s sheets. . . .”). That the protagonist is the caretaker of the hotel who is trapped
there in the winter puts into relief the unavailability of escape from the troubling aspects of home.
Recall also that the Weare proposal to take Justice Souter’s home envisioned turning it into not just
any business establishment, but a hotel, deploying the uncanny theme of home that is not home. See
above, section I.A. The hotel is the setting of the paradigmatic psychological horror ﬁlm, Alfred
Hitchcock’s thriller, Psycho (Paramount Pictures, ). 
. Cf. Frank Manchel, “What about Jack? Another Perspective on Family Relationships in Stanley
Kubrick’s The Shining,” . Film Literature Quarterly ,  () (“The Shining’s reception is
skewed by a contemporary critical desire to make Jack Torrance—the white, American, middle-class
father—the scapegoat for the sins of a patriarchal society.”) 
. See Jeannie Suk, “Criminal Law Comes Home,”  Yale Law Journal  ().
. She sued the town under  U.S.C. § . The Due Process Clause provides: “[N]or shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. . . .” U.S. Const. amend.
XIV, § .
. See Suk, supra note , at .
. In the words of one Texas court in a spousal burglary case, a protection order’s stay-away provision
effectively gave a wife “exclusive right of possession” and “negated” all of the husband’s rights to
enter the marital home in which they resided together. Ex Parte Davis,  S.W.d , –
(Tex. Crim. Ct. App. ).
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. See Suk, supra note , at .
. See, e.g., Cheryl Hanna, “No Right to Choose: Mandated Victim Participation in Domestic Vio-
lence Prosecutions,”  Harvard Law Review ,  () (“Abused women often will not
cooperate and refuse to appear in court.”).
. Gonzales v. City of Castle Rock,  F.d , (th Cir. ) (en banc). 
. Id. at –. The court had to distinguish the case from DeShaney v. Winnebago County Depart-
ment of Social Services,  U.S.  (), in which the Supreme Court famously refused to ﬁnd a
substantive due process right to the state’s protection of individuals from private violence.
. See Castle Rock,  F.d, at  (citing Bd. of Regents of State Coll. v. Roth,  U.S.  ();
Perry v. Sindermann,  U.S.  (); Goss v. Lopez,  U.S.  (); Sniadach v. Family Fin.
Corp.,  U.S.  (); Barry v. Barchi,  U.S.  (); Bell v. Burson,  U.S.  ();
Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co.,  U.S.  (); Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 
U.S.  (); Mathews v. Eldridge,  U.S.  (); Goldberg v. Kelly,  U.S.  ()).
. Id. at .
. Id. at –.
. Id. at .
. Id. at .
. Id. at  (quoting Transcript of Colorado House Judiciary Hearings on House Bill , Febru-
ary , ).
. Id. at –. The court then found that Jessica Gonzales had been denied her right not to have her
property taken without a hearing when the police failed to heed her calls for enforcement of the
order. Id. at –.
. Cf. Daryl J. Levinson, “Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration,”  Columbia Law Review
 ().
. See Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales,  U.S. , – ().
. See id. at  (quoting Colo. Rev. Stat. § --.()(a) (Lexis )). 
. The President of National Organization for Women proclaimed, “This is a truly outrageous deci-
sion—the U.S. Supreme Court just hung a ‘shoot here’ sign around the necks of battered women
and their children all across the country.” Press Release, National Organization for Women,
Supreme Court Leaves Women More Vulnerable to Domestic Violence (June , ), available
at http://www.now.org/press/-/-.html. See also Sarah M. Buel, Commentary, “Bat-
tered Women Betrayed,” Los Angeles Times, July , , at  (“The unavoidable result of this
decision is that cowardly cops will once again feel empowered to ignore battered women’s pleas for
help.”); Michelle Kline, “Gonzales Ruling Endangers Women and Children,” Nat’l NOW Times
(Nat’l Org. for Women), Summer/Fall , available at http://www.now.org/nnt/summerfall-
/gonzalesvcastlerock.html.
. Castle Rock,  U.S. at  (Stevens, J., dissenting).
. See id. at  (“[T]he Court fails to come to terms with the wave of domestic violence statutes that
provides the crucial context for understanding Colorado’s law.”).
. Conference Advertisement, University of Denver Strum College of Law et al., Town of Castle Rock
v. Gonzales: Some are Guilty—All are Accountable: Accountability in the Age of Denial, http://
www.aclu.org/pdfs/gonzalesconference.pdf (last visited August , ).
. See, e.g., Emily J. Sack, “The Domestic Relations Exception, Domestic Violence, and Equal
Access to Federal Courts,”  Washington University Law Review , –, – ()
(arguing that Castle Rock denies federal rights to victims of domestic violence and in doing so
denies women full citizenship); Deborah M. Weissman, “The Personal Is Political—and Eco-
nomic: Rethinking Domestic Violence,”  Brigham Young University Law Review , 
(“After years of efforts to develop law enforcement protocols and pass new laws to oblige the arrest
of violators of domestic violence orders, the Court ruled that the police were not required to
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enforce restraining orders, even where state law required enforcement.”). See also Sara B. Poster,
“An Unreasonable Constitutional Restraint: Why the Supreme Court’s Ruling in Town of Castle
Rock v. Gonzales Rests on Untenable Rationales,”  Temple Political & Civil Rights Law Review 
(); Nicole M. Quester, “Decision in Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales Continues to Deny
Domestic Violence Victims Meaningful Recourse,”  Akron Law Review  (); Christopher
J. Roederer, “Another Case in Lochner’s Legacy, the Court’s Assault on New Property: The Right
to the Mandatory Enforcement of a Restraining Order Is a ‘Sham,’ ‘Nullity,’ and ‘Cruel Decep-
tion,’”  Drake Law Review  (). 
. See, e.g., Castle Rock,  U.S. at  (noting that “a true mandate of police action” might emerge
from language stronger than that used by the Colorado Legislature). 
. See id. at  (stating that the Court’s holding “does not mean States are powerless to provide vic-
tims with personally enforceable remedies,” and that “the people of Colorado are free to craft such
a system under state law”). 
. See, e.g., Diane Carman, “Castle Rock Ruling Needs a Response,” Denver Post, July , , at B
(“We’ve got to come back with a law that says more clearly what we thought we were doing in the
ﬁrst place. . . . We have to make it very, very clear to law enforcement that we’re not talking about
[responding] if you feel like it.”) (quoting Colorado State Representative Morgan Carroll); Edito-
rial, “High Court Wrong on Police’s Duties,” Miami Herald, July , , at A; Press Release,
American Civil Liberties Union, ACLU Disappointed with Supreme Court Ruling on Domestic
Violence Orders of Protection (June , ) (“[S]tate legislatures must take the lead in protecting
victims of domestic violence and pass laws that will hold police accountable for taking protection
orders seriously.”); G. Kristian Miccio, “What Does ‘Shall’ Mean?,” Denver Post, July , , at
E (“We should move on . . . to the state Capitol and demand that Colorado legislators mean what
they say.”); Press Release, Oklahoma House of Representatives, Protection for Abused Women
Weakened by Supreme Court: Lawmaker Vows to Strengthen State Law in Response (June ,
). The National Network to End Domestic Violence referred to Castle Rock in urging Con-
gress to strengthen and reauthorize the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA). Press Release, The
National Network to End Domestic Violence, Statement of Fernando Laguarda, Counsel of
Record (June , ). VAWA was reauthorized, and now provides grants for “Jessica Gonzales
Victim Assistants” who serve as liaisons between DV victims and local law enforcement to “assist
or secure the safety of the person seeking enforcement of a protection order.” Violence Against
Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of , Pub. L. No. -, §  (). 
. See Castle Rock,  U.S. at –.
. Id. at  (emphasis added).
. Id. (quoting Blackstone’s view that “besides the injury [they do] to individuals,” criminal acts
“strike at the very being of society”).
. See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, “‘The Rule of Love’: Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy,”  Yale
Law Journal , – () (“[D]espite the contemporary feminist movement’s efforts to
pierce the veil of privacy talk surrounding [marital violence], Americans still reason about marital
violence in the discourse of affective privacy.”).
. Domestic violence is also an international human rights issue. For example, the ACLU ﬁled a peti-
tion with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights on behalf of Jessica Gonzales, claim-
ing violations of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man. See Gonzales v. U.S.,
Case ., Inter-Am C.H.R., Report No. /, OEA/Ser/L/V/II., doc.  () (decid-
ing that the IACHR can hear Gonzales’s case). See also American Civil Liberties Union, Violence
Against Women: Jessica Gonzales v. U.S.A., http://www.aclu.org/womensrights/violence/
gonzalesvusa.html (last visited June , ) (detailing all events and documents in the case).
. Castle Rock,  U.S. at – (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
. See id. at –. 
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. See id. at . 
. Cf. id. at  (Souter, J., concurring) (stating that Jessica Gonzales’s due process claim “collaps[es]
the distinction between property protected and the process that protects it, and would federalize
every mandatory state-law direction to executive ofﬁcers”). 
. A chiasmus is a rhetorical ﬁgure wherein two related clauses feature inverted parallelism, or a criss-
cross structure.
. Homi K. Bhabha, The Location of Culture (London, New York: Routledge, ),  (characterizing
the “unhomely moment” as one in which “the borders between home and world become confused;
and uncannily, the private and the public become part of each other”).
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